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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Some reflections on the possible link between bovine
spongiform encephalopathy and the new variant of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has suddenly become
the focus of scientific, epidemiologic and, not least,
passionate political debate following the March 1996
statement on a possible link between bovine spongi-
form encephalopathy (BSE) and the new variant of
CJD (nvCJD) by the Secretary of State for Health
of the United Kingdom in the House of Commons.
However, CJD is a rare disease; most physicians have
never seen a single case and, hopefully, will not see any
during their career. CJD is the commonest type of the
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) or
prion diseases; CJD occurs in inherited, acquired
and sporadic forms. The inherited form is autosomal
dominant and associated with coding mutations of the
prion protein gene. The acquired form occurs after
iatrogenic exposure to biological material drawn from
infected patients (cadaveric-derived growth hormone,
dura mater and cornea) or after neurosurgery with
surgical tools contaminated during brain surgery of
an infected patient. The Kuru epidemic form in Papua
New Guinea was transmitted through cannibalistic
rituals. The sporadic form which accounts for 85% of
all CJD cases occurs worldwide with a comparable
annual incidence rate from one country to another
(about one case per one million and per year), a mean
age of onset at around 65 years (very rare before 40
years) and a rapid progression to death (3-6 months).
However, three clusters of sporadic CJD have been
reported (two in former Czechoslovakia and one in
Israel among Jews of Libyan origin). These three
clusters are linked to a genetical susceptibility associated
with anomalies of the gene that codes for PrP Analytic
epidemiologic studies, until now, have been unable to
identify any consistent risk factors for the occurrence
of the sporadic form of CJD (environmental, food-
borne, or occupational exposure) other than a genetic
susceptibility (methionine homozygotes at codon 129).
In particular, no relationship between the incidence of
CJD in humans and of scrapie in sheep has been
documented.
BSE was first observed clinically in April 1985 in
the UK and was identified as a spongiform encephalo-
pathy in November 1986. The epidemic peaked in
1992 (36681 cases) and to date more than 160000
cases have been notified in the UK. Ruminant-derived
meat and bone meal (MBM) were implicated as the
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mode of transmission of BSE in December 1987. As a
consequence, a ban on ruminant feed was implemented
in the UK inJuly 1988, followed more than a year later
by a ban on the use of certain specified offals (brain,
spinal cord, spleen, etc.) for human consumption and
for inclusion in MBM in England and Wales. Other
European countries have also implemented similar
measures.
Current evidence suggests that ESE originated
from MBM contaminated by a scrapie-like agent
derived froni sheep or cattle. The infectiousness of
MBM was probably facilitated by changes in the early
1980s in the method of rendering of ruminant offal
into MBM which made it less effective in neutralizing
the BSE agent. Although the pattern of the BSE
epidemic in the UK is consistent with a main route
of transmission through contaminated feed, a vertical
route of transmission ofBSE from dam to calf has been
discussed since 1995, and a 10% rate of transmission has
even been reported recently [1]. In contrast to scrapie
in sheep and goats and other TSEs in rodents, so far
there is no evidence that cattle genotype influences the
susceptibility to BSE.
The emergence of BSE and its epidemic spread
in the UK have raised many questions and concerns
about the transmissibility of this new non-conventional
agent to other species and to humans through the
consumption of infectious beef products. Since its
emergence in UK cattle, ESE has been transmitted to
other species, either naturally or experimentally. BSE
has been transmitted naturally to cats probably through
the consumption of contaminated beef-derived pet
food (69 cases in the UK, one in Denmark and one in
Ireland), and other wild feline species and antelopes in
zoologic parks. Other species, such as mink in the
United States, may also have been affected by the BSE
agent. The BSE agent is transmissible experimentally
by inoculation into the brain to mice, sheep, pigs and
monkeys and by the oral route to sheep, goats and mice.
Several other European countries have reported
cases ofESE: most of which were not among imported
animals: the Republic ofIreland (188 cases), France (26
cases), Switzerland (231 cases) and Portugal (61 cases).
Several other sporadic cases were reported among
cows imported from the UK to Oman (two cases), the
Falkland Islands (one case), Canada (one case), Denmark
(one case), Germany (four cases) and Italy (two cases).
BSE has been introduced into the cattle of these
countries by importation of either infected animals [2]
or ofinfected MBM [3]. Based on the incidence ofBSE
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in the UK cattle, the number of BSE cases that should
have occurred in the cattle of other European countries
from the importation of infected cattle from the UK
was estimated at 1668 cases [2]. So far a very small
proportion of these cases have been officially reported.
Therefore, BSE cannot be considered as a British
problem alone, and potential exposure of humans to
infectious beef may have occurred, although to a much
lower extent than in the UK, in other countries; a
European approach is therefore required.
Because of the occurrence ofBSE, and to conduct
epidemiologic studies on a larger sample, a surveillance
and research project on CJD in five European countries
(the UK, France, Germany, The Netherlands and Italy)
was initiated in 1993 [4]. The goal of this project was
to assess a possible change in the incidence of CJD in
relation to the BSE epidemic and to develop etiologic
studies of the risk factors associated with sporadic cases
of CJD. The recognition ofnvCJD in the UK in March
1996 about 10 years after the beginning of the BSE
epidemic has changed dramatically the theoretical
risk of transmission of BSE to humans through the
consumption of infectious beef to a possible one [5].
At present, 15 confirmed cases have been identified in
the UK and are characterized by a younger age at onset,
a longer duration of illness and very specific unusual
neuropathological lesions (PrP plaques) [5]. Some
authors have questioned whether nvCJD has really
emerged as a new entity. Although a detection bias
cannot be ruled out completely, it is very unlikely that
a progressive dementia affecting young adults that
results in death within 6 to 24 months would have
gone undetected for so long. In addition, the unusual
neuropathologic features of nvCJD (PrP plaques) have
not been found in all past CJD cases investigated in the
UK and other European countries [5]. A case ofnvCJD
has also been reported in France, which suggests,
according to the hypothesis of a link between nvCJD
and BSE, that the potential impact of BSE on human
health may not be limited to the UK.
The link between BSE and the nvCJD agent has
not been formally scientifically demonstrated; however,
we should already be thinking according to the hypo-
thesis of a link between BSE and nvCJD, about the
potential consequences on human health in the decades
to come! The question should be dealt with in two
parts: (1) is the BSE agent the same as the nvC]D one
and (2) how does transmission to humans occur?
Although no definitive answer can be given to question
1, the geographic and temporal correlation between
nvC]D and BSE and recent scientific fmdings are
strongly supportive of the BSE-CJD link. The
scientific findings in favor of such a link include the
similarities of the neuropathologic lesions observed on
the brain of a monkey that developed TSE after
experimental inoculation with BSE-contaminated brain
[6] and the fact that the disease-related isoform of
the prion protein of nvCJD has strain characteristics
distinct from those of other types of CJD (called type
4) but which resemble those of BSE transmitted to
mice, domestic cats and macaques [7]. Studies on the
transmission of the nvCJD strain to non-transgenic
mice and transgenic mice that express human PrP will
probably shed new light on this debate within the next
few months. Demonstration that the agent of BSE and
nvC]D is the same will not prove the transmission to
humans by the consumption of infectious beefbut will
be very much in favor of it. Additional epidemiologic
evidence will be, however, necessary to demonstrate
this route of transmission.
In contrast to scrapie in sheep, and based on
current knowledge, the infectious tissues of BSE-
infected animals are limited to the brain and the spinal
cord. The risk of transmission to humans, should, in
theory, be limited. However, brain and spinal cord
tissues may have been introduced into meat prior to the
1988 and 1989 offal ban. As for the AIDS epidemic,
one should distinguish BSE disease from BSE infection:
because most cows infected with BSE are slaughtered
for human consumption before BSE signs occur (the
incubation period is about 5 years) most of the infected
cows entered the human food chain before 1990.
Under this assumption, Anderson et al [8] have
estimated, through a very comprehensive modeling of
the UK BSE epidemic (based on back calculation as for
AIDS), that 903000 animals had been infected of
which 446 000 entered the food chain prior to the
1989 ban and 283 000 more before the end of 1995.
Although these results indicate that humans have been
widely exposed in the UK, nothing is known of the
actual risk (probability) of transmission to humans.
Therefore, no serious projection can be made until we
know more about the temporal trend of nvCJD (the
shape of the epidemiologic curve, the time interval for
the number of cases of the nvCJD to be multiplied by
2, the distribution of the incubation period, etc.).
Therefore, a risk analysis is very difficult or impossible
because many of the necessary parameters, routes of
transmission to humans, infective dose, probability of
infection when exposed etc.) are unknown and will
remain so for some time. In this context and following
intense media attention in the UK, the president of the
Royal Statistical Society answered the question of the
predicted size of the nvC]D epidemic with the answer
'zero to million' [9]. However, attempts were made to
estimate the potential size of a future nvCJD epidemic
based on the 14 first UK cases [10]. Although this study
did not make any real prediction, it underlined several
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important points: first it is very much too soon to
conclude that because of the limited number of
confirmed nvCJD cases there will not be a large
epidemic in the future; second, althouh the number of
cases over the next years will provide valuable
information, it could take a few more years before any
firm indication will be available on the number of cases
of nvCJD to expect [10]. In addition, the authors
showed clearly that no serious prediction will be
possible without improving the current estimates of the
distribution of the incubation period of nvCJD [10].
In the countries other than those which parti-
cipated in the European surveillance scheme, surveil-
lance of CJD is very heterogenous and appears to be
not very suitable for timely detection of any change in
the incidence or CJD or the nvCJD [11]. Moreover,
current data do not allow meaningful comparisons.
This problem and the potential for a change in the
incidence of CJD in the years to come stress the need
for a European consolidated surveiHance of CJD which
should not be limited to five countries and should
include non-EU countries such as Switzerland [11].
Because CJD and nvCJD are rare events, at least for the
time being, a multicenter approach at the EU level will
facilitate epidemiologic studies that could not be done
in a single country. A similar European collaboration is
necessary for the surveillance ofBSE in other European
countries. It has been shown recently that the BSE
agent can be transmitted by the oral route to sheep with
a disease and tissue infectivity distribution similar to the
one observed in the natural scrapie [12]. Because the
contamination of the ovine herd by the BSE agent
through MBM is a plausible hypothesis, an outbreak of
scrapie caused by the BSE agent could occur among
sheep without being detected by the usual clinical and
pathologic methods. Such an outbreak in sheep linked
to the BSE agent would be much more difficult to
control than an outbreak among cattle (it is assumed
that its transmission among the sheep flock would be
similar to the transmission of natural scrapie) and could
add a new threat to humans. The surveillance of scrapie
should therefore be widely reinforced to detect a
possible occurrence in good time. New tests that allow
the typing ofthe protease prion PrP (type 4) from tonsil
155
biopsies in nvCJD patients [13] may be very helpful in
the future to characterize TSE agents and monitor their
occurrence in humans and animals.
Jean Claude Desenclos
Reseau National de Sante Publique,
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